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Abstract 
This paper presents a two sector dynamic general equilibrium model in which income 
smoothing takes place within the households (intra-temporally), and consumption smoothing 
takes place among the households (inter-temporally). Idiosyncratic risk sharing within the 
family is based on an income smoothing contract. There are two sectors in the model, the 
regular sector and the underground sector, and the smoothing comes from the underground 
sector, which is countercyclical with respect aggregate GDP. The paper shows that the 
simulated disaggregated consumption and income series (that are the regular and underground 
consumption flows) are more sensitive to exogenous changes in sector-specific productivity and 
tax rates than regular and underground income flows, and that this picture is reversed when the 
aggregate series are considered.  
Keywords: Dynamic equilibrium models; Intertemporal Consumer Choice, Intertemporal Firm 
Choice, underground economy. 
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1 Introduction. 
The growth and the size of the underground economy in the OECD countries have been 
illustrated in many studies. In this paper we analyze the implications on consumption and 
income dynamics over a sizeable underground economy. This paper presents a two sector 
equilibrium growth model, in which one sector represents the underground economy, and the 
other stands for underground activities5.  
The model joins together three phenomena to improve the understanding of the dynamics of 
consumption and production decision making: consumption smoothing, income smoothing, and 
risk sharing using a contract based upon a countercyclical underground sector. The contract 
provides the risk sharing opportunity for smoothing income and consumption. Intra-sector 
production smoothing, as well as the non-market activities, are generated by existence of 
distortionary taxation. 
There are three main results: 
 First, the model shows that the simulated disaggregated consumption and income series 
(that are the regular and underground consumption flows in this context) are more sensitive to 
exogenous changes in sector-specific productivity and tax rates than regular and underground 
income flows. Selected volatility measures for disaggregated consumption series are greater 
than or equal to those of the corresponding income series.  
Second, the picture is reversed when the aggregate series (regular plus underground) are 
considered. The impulse response function of aggregate consumption to innovations in 
productivity and tax rates is below the response of aggregate income. In addition, aggregate 
consumption is less volatile than aggregate income (over 1000 simulations), which is one of the 
most robust empirical stylized facts matched by equilibrium growth models.  
Third, we show that in our model agents are able to disentangle consumption and income 
by relying on the countercyclical behavior of the underground sector. In this sense, the 
underground sector offers risk sharing opportunities to household’s members, which is 
exploited by entering the income-smoothing contract. 
The model is calibrated for the Italian economy because it presents a large underground 
sector, which allows appreciating better the impact of underground activities on the overall 
                                                 
5 Underground activities are especially significant in many European countries where the underground 
sector represents from 15 to 35 percent of the GDP. In the U.S. the underground sector is about 8 or 9 
percent of the GDP. (see, for instance, Schneider and Enste, 2000). There is no universal agreement on 
what defines the underground economy. Most recent studies use one of more of the following definitions: 
(a) unrecorded economy (failing to fully or properly record economic activity, such as hiring workers off-
the-book); (b) unreported economy (legal activity meant to evade the tax code); (c) illegal economy 
(trading in illegal goods and services). We are interested about the size of the underground economy as 
encompassing those activities which are otherwise legal but go unreported or unrecorded, i.e. bits (a) and 
(b). 
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economy. Needless to say, this analysis is addressed to European countries like Belgium, 
Denmark, Greece, Portugal and Spain (see Busato and Chiarini, 2004). Moreover, the 
simulation outcomes are robust for many countries presenting a large size of underground 
activities.6. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we summarize the empirical evidence about 
underground activities, consumption smoothing and income smoothing. Section 3 describes the 
structure of the model, and Section 4 discusses our choice of functional forms and parameters 
values. Section 5 outlines simulation results, while Section 6 presents our conclusions. 
 
2. Selected stylized facts 
In all industrialized countries the underground sector is large both in terms of the labor input 
and in terms of the output produced. Schneider and Enste (2000) show that the underground 
economic activity represents on average 16.9% of the GNP for the OECD countries. 
Different measurement techniques provide similar approximate magnitudes of the size and 
development of the underground economy.7 In addition, what is most interesting from the 
short run perspective is the countercyclical behavior of the underground component. Busato 
and Chiarini (2004) present evidence of this phenomenon for Italy, New Zealand, the United 
States and the United Kingdom. 
Income smoothing is a relevant phenomenon, as well. Mordoch (1995) suggests that a great 
deal of risk is averted by households in inputs allocation.8 This means that the members of a 
family can pool together their resources, in particular their labor supplies, and allocate them 
more efficiently over time, and across sectors (see also Gallie and Paugam, 2000).9 
 
Between consumption data and the majority of theoretical models, there exist two critical 
discrepancies, frequently neglected. First, consumption data usually refers to households, while 
majority of theoretical models is cast into the representative agent framework. Second, since a 
                                                 
6 0ur model is calibrated to match selected moments for the Italian economy within the sample 1970-1996. We 
choose Italy because of the availability of a complete data set on the non-market sector. Note however, that Italy 
presents a share of underground economy equally to approximately 20 or 30 percent of the GDP, which according to 
Schneider and Enste (2000), corresponds to several European countries like Norway, Belgium, Portugal, Spain, 
Greece and Denmark. 
7 There exist several methods of estimating the size of the underground economy. A detailed survey of the three most 
widely used methods to measure the hidden activity (the direct approaches, the indicator approach and the model 
approaches) are discussed in Schneider and Enste (2000). See also Feige (1989), Thomas (1992; 1999) and Chiarini 
and Marzano (2004) among others. 
8 Note, however, that altruism within extended family is still controversial, at least for the United States. Altonji, 
Hayashi and Kotlikoff (1992) for instance reject the hypothesis of altruism within the extended family. But, in the 
conclusions, the authors underline how they do believe that significant altruistically motivated transfers occur in 
United States, especially among wealthy, who are underrepresented in the Panel Study on Income Dynamics (PSID). 
9 For example we may think to the fact that in a large percentage of married and/or cohabiting persons between 25 
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 4
countercyclical underground sector may offer risk sharing opportunities to workers, the 
conclusions of models that do not explicitly incorporate this sector, may be seriously 
compromised for economies in which underground economy represents a significant share of 
actual GDP.  
The model presented in the following Section specifically addresses these issues. We tell a 
simple story of a two-person household, and we compare the individual consumption and 
income profiles, with those of the family. 
 
3 Structure of the Model 
The model draws from Busato and Chiarini (2004), while differing in two important aspects. 
First, we generalize the household structure by introducing a simple form of heterogeneity;10 
second, we model income smoothing and within-family consumption reallocation by a specific 
contract. 
There are three agents in the model: the firm, the extended family, and the government. In 
addition there are the regular and the underground sectors. 
The members of the extended family choose consumption, investment, and hours worked at 
each date and in each sector to maximize the expected discounted value of the family's utility 
subject to an income smoothing contract, a budget constraint, a proportional tax rate on the 
regular wage, and the law of motion for the capital stock. 
In each period, the firm rents capital only in the regular sector, but hires labor in both 
sectors.11 It produces output in both the sectors by solving a period-by-period profit maxi-
mization problem. The firm solves this series of one-period problems subject to a probability 
that it may be discovered producing in the underground economy, convicted of tax evasion and 
subject to a penalty surcharge. 
Finally, a government levies proportional taxes on output and labor income, and balances its 
budget at each point in time. We assume that government spending on goods and services does 
not contribute to either production or to extended family utility. 
 
3.1 The Extended Families. 
Consider a production economy populated by many consumers. Each consumer works in only 
one of the two sectors. They receive incomes that are functions of idiosyncratic shocks. Within 
the economy there exist extended families, exogenously determined and of fixed size. Within 
                                                                                                                                               
and 54 years old, there is a single job-holder (i.e. Gallie and Paugam, 2000). 
10 We will see that, given the structure of our income smoothing contract, we may rewrite the heterogeneous agent 
model as a representative agent model. This claim is proved in Proposition 1. 
11 This assumption reflects a basic stylized fact of many underground economies. 
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each family, the members have perfect information concerning each other's idiosyncratic shocks 
to each sector.12 For simplicity we assume that there exists one family, which is composed by 
two working individuals, Mr. κ and Miss. l. 13 Without loss of generality, we assume that Mr. κ 
works in the regular sector, while Miss. l works in the underground sector. 
 
Since Mr. κ, and Miss. l are good friends until many years, we may argue that their 
preferences are not too far. Hence, assuming that they have the same utility function for 
consumption should not be seen as a forcing. They have, however, a different preference 
structure for labor supply, which is consistent with the fact they work in different sectors. We 
can use a variant of the Cho and Rogerson's (1988) extended family labor supply model. 
Specifically, extended family composed of Mr. κ  and Mss. l is characterized by the following 
instantaneous utility function: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), , ,l l l l lt t t t t l t t t tU c c l l u c u c l l lκ κ κ κκφ φ ν µ= + − − , (1) 
where u(cκt) and u(clt) represent utility from Mr. κ and Miss. l consumption, and v(lκt)llt 
describes the disutility of working in both sectors. We interpret the last term, µ(llt ), as reflecting 
the idiosyncratic cost of working in the underground sector. This cost may be associated in 
particular with the lack of any social and health insurance in the underground sector.14 Given 
their long standing friendship, Mr. κ shares part of Miss. l concerns of working in that sector. 
For the same reason, we assume: φk= φl= ½.15 
An aspect of primary interest in our labor market is workers' labor supply in the two sectors 
of the economy. Mr. κ , which works in the regular sector, supplies lkt, and receive a wage wkt = 
wt(1- τt), where τt is the stochastic tax rate on wage income. Miss l, who works in the other 
sector, offers llt, and earns a wage wlt= wt. The family budget constraint is: 
tot
t
tot
t
tot
tt
l
tt
k
ttt XCKRlwlw +=++− )1( τ ,   (2) 
where lt
k
t
tot
t ccC +=  and Xtott represents total consumption and total investment by the family, 
respectively. Eventually they pool their savings together, and rent the grand total, Xtott, to the 
firms, wh capital stock evolves according to the following state equation: 
( ) totttotttott XKK +−=+ δ11 ,   (3) 
where δ denotes the exogenous and constant depreciation rate. We refer to equations (1) to (3) 
                                                 
12 This hypothesis will be important since it simplifies agents' interaction after the contract introduction. 
13 We choose to restrict the analysis to one family to keep notation simple. The size and the number of the extended 
family can easily be enlarged. 
14 Note that since working in the underground sector is costly, as we can see from the last term of the instantaneous 
utility function, we rule out equilibria were all labor supply goes to the underground sector. In 
other words, if llt→∞, then µ(llt )→∞, making this decision too costly for the family. 
15 The choice of ½ is without loss of generality, it just simplifies the algebra. 
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as to the Heterogeneous Agent Model (HAM). 
But one day, unexpectedly, a spark ignites between the two. Mr. κ and Miss. l fall in love, and 
are offered an “consumption and income smoothing contract (CISC)”. Readers unfamiliar with 
Contract theory would call it a “marriage” contract. The contract, defined below, says the 
consumers should pool together income (and thus labor supply) and consumption. 
Definition 1 (Consumption and Income Smoothing Contract) The contract has three 
features: 
1. lkt = θtLt  and llt = (1-θt)Lt. This means, that Mr. κ and Miss. l pool together their labor 
supplies, Lt, then they allocate a share θt  to regular sector, and the remaining (1-θt)  to 
underground sector. 
2. The family will choose total consumption Ctott. Then Mr. κ and Miss. l  consumption will 
be tott
k
t Cc *ω=   and ( ) tottlt Cc *1 ω−= .16 When agents have the same utility function 
for consumption, ω*=1/2.17  
3. We assume that agents accept the contract, that it holds for each period in time, and 
that it is incentive compatible and perfectly enforceable.18 
 
In this paper we do not consider strategic interaction among agents. The contract has the 
simple goal to pool together labor supply, and consumption, insuring the family against 
idiosyncratic shocks. In addition, its structure serves as foundation of Proposition 1. 
Proposition 1 (Representative Agent Model and Heterogeneous Agents Model) Under the 
income smoothing contract, as in Definition 1, the Heterogeneous Agent Model (Equations (1) 
to (3)) is equivalent to a Representative Agent Model characterized by instantaneous utility 
function ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )jtjtjtjtjtjt vcucU θµθθθ −−−−= 11, , budget constraint 
( ) jtjtjtttjtt XcKRw +=+− τθ1  and capital accumulation constrain (3).  Equivalence is in the 
sense of having the same First Order Conditions. 
Proof. See Appendix A . 
 
Remark 1 ("A Transparent Representative Agent Model") By Proposition 1, we transform 
the HAM into a Representative Household model of a special kind.19 The novelty of our 
                                                 
16 In this way individual consumption is disentangled from individual income. It may be interesting to note that this is 
the argument behind the risk sharing and consumption literature (see Deaton, 1992 for a survey). 
17 This claim can be showed quite easily, but for completeness we precise the argument in Appendix B. 
18 By definition, an implicit contract will need to be sustained as an equilibrium in the interaction between the parties 
(Salanie', 1997). The contract we present in this model has the very simple goal to provide insurance against 
production idiosyncratic risk. For this reasons we assume that agents accept the contract. 
19 Notice that this an application of an already known result. Indeed Rubinstein (1974) shows that when agents have 
homogenous beliefs, and time additive utility function with linear risk tolerance, and same exponent, these 
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approach consists in inspecting the composition mechanism of income and consumption flows 
occurring within the family, and across sectors. 
Specifically, our model generates, for both income and consumption, three series: two 
"pre-contract" or disaggregated series (regular and underground), and one "after-contract" 
or aggregated series. The former series refer to individual consumers, and we interpret them 
as consumption and income profile which arise without contract. The latter ones belong to 
the household. Then we can explicitly compare the stochastic properties of the different 
series. We may think to ours, as to a 
"Transparent Representative Agent Model”.20 
Relying on Proposition 1, and assuming that there exists a continuum of households, which 
are uniformly distributed over a unit interval, we specify a following functional form for the j - 
th household momentary utility function.21 Specifically (1) becomes:22 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 





+
−−−+−−
−=
++−
η
θθγ
θθ
ηγ
1
11
11
1;
111 j
tj
t
j
t
qj
tj
t
j
t fhq
ccu   (4) 
 
To have a well behaved utility function, we assume that 1,;0, −>≥ ηγfh , that all the parts 
of the momentary utility function are well behaved.23 The first quantity denotes the utility from 
aggregate consumption stream, while the second term represents the overall disutility of 
working;24 the last term reflects the idiosyncratic cost of working in the underground sector. In 
particular, this cost may be associated with the lack of any social and health insurance in the 
underground sector. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
assumptions imply demand aggregation. 
20 We choose to end up with a representative agent model since the collected data on income and consumption refers, 
more or less implicitly, to a representative household. In other words, we harmonize the theoretical scheme with the 
data. If, for instance, we had chosen to calibrate direct1y the heterogeneous agent model, we could not be sure 
anymore of equivalence between theory and data. 
21 The generalization to continuum of households is not necessary, but is consistent with the traditional set up of 
equilibrium growth models (see Prescott and Mehra, 1980). 
22 This specification is adapted from Cho and Rogerson (1988) and Cho and Cooley (1994). Unlike the extreme cases 
of indivisible labor (Hansen 1985), where all the fluctuations occur on the extensive margin, and the divisible labor in 
which the fluctuations take place on the intensive margin, in this formulation of preferences households may allocate 
their time along both margins (intensive-hours and extensive-employment margin). Cho and Rogerson achieve this 
feature by introducing heterogeneity into the opportunity sets of household decision makers, and Cho and Cooley 
introduce some fixed costs of going to work that are not explicitly modelled. This allows us to capture changes in 
labor in both the market and the underground sector simultaneously, and it is consistent with the data, where we 
observe substantial variations in both the markets. 
23 Restriction on the utility function to make the inter-temporal optimization problem well defined are derived in 
Busato and Chiarini (2004). 
24 Notice that there exist perfect substitutability across sector, in the sense that there are no adjustment costs while 
transferring labor supply (demand) from a sector to an other. Each sector, however, has its own peculiar 
characteristics that the instantaneous utility function tries to capture with regard to consumer's behavior. 
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3.1.1 Productivity shocks and tax rates. 
Finally, we formalize productivity and tax rates as a stochastic vector of variables that follow 
univariate AR( 1) processes in log: 
 
ttt AA ε+Ω=+1  
 
where At is a vector [Mt, Zt, tt, τt] containing the productivity shocks, Mt, Zt, the stochastic 
corporate tax rate, tt, and the stochastic personal income tax rate τt. Ω =diag (ρi), where i = m, z, 
t, τ, is a 4 x 4 matrix describing the autoregressive components of the disturbances relative to 
each of the four shocks. The innovation, ε’t = [εm, ε z, ε t, ε τ,] is a vector of i.i.d. random 
variables. 
3.1.2 The Stochastic Dynamic Programming Problem for Households. 
Let Vt(Kjt, At) be the value function for the household problem: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]{ }111
,
;,max;
1
++++=
+
t
j
tt
j
t
j
t
K
t
j
tt AKVEcuAKV j
t
j
t
βθ
θ
,  (5) 
 
subject to momentary utility function (4), to budget constraint (A.5 in Appendix A), and the low 
of motion for the household capital stock (3). The optimality conditions for the problem are the 
Euler equation (6.1) and the intra-temporal consumption-Labor allocation condition (6.2):25 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ηγγ θθγγθτ
β
j
t
j
t
j
t
qj
ttt
tt
q
j
t
j
t
fhcw
R
c
c
E
−+


+
++−−=




ℑ


=
+−
+
−
+
1
1
20
1
1
1
1 /
 (6.1; 6.2)  
where ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) 11111111 111 ++−+−+++ ≡+−=−+− ttimtittt RrKMt δθαδ αα  from firm profit maximization 
(see below). 
 
3.2 The Firms. 
There are I firms. Each firm Ii∈ produces both in the regular and in the underground sector 
using two different production functions: 
( ) ( ) iuttiutimtittimt lZylkMy == − ;1 αα   (7) 
The regular output, yimt, is the result of capital, kit and regular labor, limt, applied to a Cobb 
Douglas production function. The underground output, yiut, is produced with a production 
                                                 
25 Appendix A characterizes in details the model, and states precisely the solution procedure. 
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function which uses only underground labor, liut,. Finally, Mt and Zt are the idiosyncratic 
stochastic productivity shocks. This formulation is consistent with the behavior underling the 
existence of an underground sector. Indeed the firms have no incentive to invest capital in the 
underground sector26. 
In equilibrium each firm allocates a share, θit of the total labor, Lt, to regular production 
(therefore limt = θitLt) and the remainder, l - θit to the other sector (therefore liut = (1-θit)Lt).27 
Normalizing Lt to unity, we can rewrite (7) as: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )ittiutitittimt ZykMy θθ αα −== − 1;1   (8) 
 
When the firm produces in the regular sector, its output is taxed with certainty at the 
stochastic rate tt. When producing in the underground sector, the firm may be discovered, with 
probability p, and forced to pay the stochastic tax rate, tt, increased by a surcharge factor, s> l, 
applied to the standard tax rate. 
Assuming that the firm produces in both sectors, we can describe its revenues as follow: 
 
( ) iuttimtti tD ystyty −+−= 1)1(,  with prob. p 
 
i
ut
i
mtt
i
tND yyty +−= )1(,   with prob. (1-p), 
 
where yiD,t is the output when the firm's underground activity is detected and  yiND,t  is the output 
produced when the firm's underground activities go undetected. The expected value of the 
output is then given by ( ) iyppyyE tNDi tDtit ,, )1(/ −+=ℑ  .  
The production costs come from the labor hired in both sectors, and from rented capital. The 
cost of regular labor is represented by wage paid for hours worked; a wage that is augmented by 
social security taxes at a rate that we will assume is equal to the corporate income tax rate, tt. In 
accordance with the rationale behind underground activities, we assume that the firm does not 
                                                 
26 Notice that this structure is equivalent to a more general set up with two production functions which use both the 
inputs, like for example yimt = Mt (kit)α (limt)1-α and yiut = Zt (kiut)β (liut)1-β. According to Uzawa (1965) and Lucas (1988) 
if β<α  we can set the smaller elasticity to zero without loss of any generality. It follows that the share of capital in the 
labor intensive production function is null and therefore an optimizing firm would choose kut = 0 for each t. Because 
we assume that the underground sector is labor intensive, we rely on this argument. 
27 The use of the share is also consistent both with the fact that labor supply per person is approximately stationary in 
many economies although the real wage grows, and with the utility function, homogenous in consumption, that we 
adopt to model the household preferences. The aim is, therefore, to analyze the movement of resources between the 
two sectors, to understand how agents want to move inputs out of the market and into the underground. The 
reallocation of hours from market to informal sector rather than exclusively from leisure to labor, increases the 
volatility of the official labor input for a given technology shock.  
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pay social contributions for labor input employed in the underground sector.28 Formally, firm 
costs are defined by:29 
 
( ) ittittttitit KrtwwKCO ++= θθ ,   (9) 
 
At each date t, firm i maximizes period expected profits: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )itittitk kCOyEitit ,/max0, θθ −ℑ≥ , 
 
to derive the regular share of aggregate labor demand ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
ααθ
1
**
1
11 


+−
−−=
tttt
tti
t
i
t twZpst
Mtk , the 
underground component ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
1
* * 1 1
1 1
1
t ti i
t t
t t t t
t M
k
pst Z w t
ααθ  − −− = −  − +  
 and the capital demand 
( ) ( ) ( ) ααθ −

 −= 1
1
** 1
t
tti
t
i
t R
Mtk  30 
 
3.3 The Government. 
Under Proposition 1 the flow government budget constraint is:31 
 
( ) tmttuttttt Gytypstw =++θτ ,  (10) 
where GGt = .32 
 
3.4 Equilibrium 
Equilibrium for our model is described as a variant on a Recursive Competitive Equilibrium 
(RCE) of Prescott and Mehra (1980) notion. Specifically, aggregate and individual quantities 
coincide, and equilibrium can be characterized as the F.O.C. of the Representative Household 
                                                 
28 Note that the tax structure is critical for the existence of underground activities, and therefore for the source 
of risk sharing. 
29 Here we have already implemented the features of consumption and income smoothing contract into i-th 
firm objective. For details, see Appendix A, Proposition 1, Lemma 2. 
30 Notice that in this context the regular share of aggregate labor demand equals the regular labor demand itself, 
because we normalize total labor to unity. The same holds for the underground labor market segment. 
31 See Appendix A, Proposition 1, Lemma 3. 
32 Notice that the Government balances its budget only in expectation, since with probability 1 - p some firms 
and workers are evading. Hence equation (10) will not be satisfied on a state by state basis. 
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on which market clearing conditions have been imposed. 
 
4 Calibration. 
The system of equations we use to compute the dynamic equilibrium of the model depends on a 
set of 12 parameters. Six pertain to household preferences, (q, h, f, η, γ, β), four to the structural-
institutional context (the probability of a firm being detected p, the surcharge factor s, the 
equilibrium income and corporate tax rates t and τ), and the remaining two parameters to 
technology (the capital elasticity α, and the capital depreciation rate δ). The fact that the data on 
the underground economy is difficult to obtain substantially complicates the calibration. 
Because we are not aware of other studies which calibrate the parameters of a general 
equilibrium model augmented with an underground sector, we precisely detail our calibration 
procedure below.  
1. The probability of being detected, p. We calibrate this parameter by estimating the 
unconditional mean of the ratio of number of inspected firms to their total number.33 For 
Italy, as well as for the majority of countries, only a portion of these data are publicly 
available. For the Italian economy, the Ministry of Labor reports that the number of 
inspected firms has been 118,119 in 2000, 106,307 in 1999 and 95,676 in 1998. The 
overall number of firms in the Italian Economy has been 4,639,393 in 2000, 4,472,375 
in 1999 and 4,311,369 in 1998. As suggested above, we first compute the probability of 
being detected in each year, p*t, and then we estimate the aggregate probability as 
∑
=
=
T
t
tpT
p
1
*1 . For the Italian economy p = 0.03.34 Even though this is not an efficient 
estimate, it represents the best possible calibration for this parameter, given the 
available data. 
2. The surcharge factor s, the income tax rate t, and the corporate tax rate τ. The 
parameter s represents the surcharge on the standard tax rate that a firm, detected 
employing workers in underground sector, must pay. According to the Italian Tax Law 
(Legislative Decree 471/97, Section 13, paragraph l) the surcharge equals 30 percent of 
the statutory tax rate if the firm pays the fine when detected, or 200 percent when the 
firm refuses to pay.35 We present results for both the values, s = 1.3 and s = 2.00.  
In Italy, corporations are subject to a progressive tax rate. A tax rate of 19 percent is 
                                                 
33 Note that an inspected firm is not necessarily convicted of evasion and therefore fined. Since inspections are based 
either on private information of Institutions, or randomly, it may happen that behavior of a perfectly honest firm will 
be inspected. 
34 These data are available on line at the web site of the Italian Ministry of Labor, at the URL 
http://www.minlavoro.it/Personale/div7-conferenzastampa..Ol032001.htm. 
35 In this case the firm will prosecuted under Criminal Law perspective, and if condemned pay 200 percent. 
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applied to the share of profits that represents 7 percent of the firm's capitalization; the 
remaining portion is then subjected to an increased tax rate of 36 percent. We calibrate 
the steady state value of the corporate tax rate as the average of these two numbers, i.e. t 
= 0.275.  
The personal income tax system is more complex, since we have five tax rates, 
spanning from 18.5 percent to 45.5 percent. The calibration of the income tax rate may 
be undertaken in two ways.36 It may be estimated as the average tax rate, weighted by 
the relative share of population in each income class. It may also be estimated as the tax 
rate associated with the average income of the working population (Adults 15-64 years 
old). We rely on the second procedure and since the average income equals 18,246 
Euros we estimate the income tax rate at 33.5 percent. 
3. The share of underground sector, l – θ.  To calibrate this parameter we refer to 
Schneider and Enste (2000) who estimate the share of the underground sector for a 
panel of OECD countries. The value for the Italian Economy, l - θ = 0.30, is also 
consistent with Mare's (1996) estimates. 
4. The preference parameters, q and β, the capital share, α, and the capital de-
preciation rate δ. These parameters are set to values commonplace in this literature 
(e.g. Fiorito and Kollintzas, 1994, or  Chiarini and Piselli 2005). More precisely, we set 
q = l, β = 0.98 and δ = 0.025. 
5. Stochastic Shocks autocorrelation coefficients, ρm, ρu, ρt, ρτ and innovation 
amplitudes, σm, σu, σt, στ . The ρ’ s are set to .90 and the σ’s to 0.003. As we stress in 
Busato and Chiarini (2004) these values are much lower than the classical ones (see 
King and Rebelo, 1999). This means that the model has a particularly efficient 
amplification mechanism which allows us to employ very small shocks. 
6. The utility function parameters h, f, η and γ. The calibration of these parameters is a 
not easy (see Cho and Cooley, 1994). We select them to match four moments: the ratio 
between standard deviation of total output σ (Yttot), and the standard deviation of total 
consumption, σ (Cttot), the correlation between total output and total consumption ρ(Cttot, 
Yttot) , the correlation between underground income and total consumption ρ(Cttot, ylt) 
and the correlation between regular income and total consumption ρ(Cttot,ykt). The 
calibrated values are h = 0.55, f = 1.99, η = 1.40, γ = 3.00.37 
                                                 
36 More precisely, the structure of the tax rates is the following as of 2001. For incomes less than 10,331 Euros tax 
rate is 18.5 percent, for incomes between 10,331 Euros and 15,496 Euros tax rate is 25.5 percent, for incomes 
between 15,496 Euros and 30,992 Euros tax rate is 33.5 percent, for incomes between 30,992 Euros and 63,283 Euros 
tax rate is 39.5 percent and, eventually, for incomes above 63,283 Euros tax rate is 45.5 percent. 
37 Cho and Cooley (1994) calibrate these parameters for the United States, and choose h = 6.0, f = 0.87, η = 0.62, γ = 
2.00. Note, however, that their formulation of the model addresses issues different from matching market and 
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5 Simulation Results. 
This section shows that an equilibrium growth model, augmented with an underground 
sector and an income smoothing contract operating within the households, generates 
consumption and income series consistent both with smoothness properties of actual data.  
Specifically, it is here shown that the “individual”, “pre-contract”, or disaggregated series (ckt, 
ykt, clt and ylt) are sufficiently volatile as in the actual data, and that the “household”, "after-
contract" or aggregated consumption and income profiles (Ctott and Yttot) satisfy smoothness 
properties presented by actual data.38 Note, however, that "pre-contract" series do not arise as 
actual income and consumption profiles, because household smooth pre-contract  income and 
consumption series on a period by period basis.39 For this reason, these series have been 
generated by numerically simulating the model.  
Comparing the stochastic properties of these two sets of variables, we can explicitly capture 
the reallocation mechanism of consumption and income between agents and between sectors, 
which is usually implicit in data collection, and in previous consumption studies. We argue that 
this is the driving force that ties our results to the countercyclicality of underground activities. 
 
5.1 Numerical Results. 
We present our results from four different perspectives. First, we show that ckt, and clt exhibit 
volatility greater than or equal to ykt and ylt respectively.40 Moreover, the former variables 
exhibit larger impact-response after innovations in productivity and tax rates. Second, the 
previous relationship is reversed when looking at aggregated series: Ctott  is smoother and less 
sensitive to innovations than Ytott. Third, we compare volatility, sensitivity to innovations, and 
correlation among the three consumption definitions, and among the three income components 
generated in our model.41 Fourth, we analyze correlations between consumption and income 
series to draw additional evidence on the volatility of disaggregated components, and on the 
smoothness of their aggregate counterparts. 
Table 1 (see section 6.1.1) and Table 2 (see section 6.1.3), and Figures 1 to 5 present the 
main results. 
                                                                                                                                               
underground moments. Specifically, they study the implications of this kind of utility function for the volatility of 
hours, employment and productivity in the United States. 
38 To precisely describe the series, we denote ykt, as "pre-contract" or "market income" earned from by Mr. k, from his 
job in the market sector, before pooling it together with Miss l "after-contract" or "underground income", ylt. Then ckt 
and clt represent Mr. k and Mrs, l, pre-contract individual consumption profiles, respectively. Finally, Ytott and Ctott 
define total income and total, after contract, consumption. 
39 Indeed, from consumption and incombe smoothing, Definition 1, point 2, it turns out that ckt= clt=1/2 Cttot. See also 
Appendix B. 
40 Where volatility is measured as the standard deviation of the Hodrick-Prescott filtered series. 
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5.1.1 Regular consumption is more volatile than regular income, and... 
Figure 1 presents impulse response functions, and Table 1 presents selected time-series 
properties  
(Figure 1 about here) 
Figure 1 shows the first 32 quarter response of ykt, ckt and Xtott to a one standard deviation 
innovation in regular-sector productivity, underground sector productivity, corporate and 
income tax rates. The curves are the quarterly percentage deviations from a baseline scenario 
where all innovations are set to zero. As the four figures show, the response of regular 
consumption series is larger or equal than that of regular income component. 
Also Table l suggests that "individual" series (ckt, ykt, clt and ylt) respect the empirical 
evidence. The table shows that k
t
k
t yc
σσ >  and that l
t
l
t yc
σσ = . Precisely, 96.2=k
tc
σ , 
07.2=k
ty
σ , and 22.2== l
t
l
t yc
σσ . It should be also noted that income components are quite 
volatile, consistently with the data.42 Finally, Table 3 (see Appendix C) shows that this result is 
robust to sensitivity analysis. 
 
TABLE 1: STANDARD DEVIATIONS 
 σ (ykt) σ (ylt) σ (Ytott) σ (ckt) σ (clt) σ (Ctott) 
Actual Data 2.27 1.11 1.44 - - 1.25 
Simul. Data (s=1.3) 2.07 
(0.22) 
2.22 
(0.23) 
1.45 
(0.15) 
2.96 
(0.28) 
2.22 
(0.23) 
1.17 
(0.14) 
Sim. Data (s=2.0) 1.99 
(0.24) 
1.94 
(0.25) 
1.40 
(0.14) 
2.71 
(0.29) 
1.94 
(0.25) 
1.14 
(0.17) 
Notes: The model is calibrated for Italian economy within the sample 1970-1996. Ctott represent the 
consumption of non durable goods and services, ckt and clt represent the regular and underground 
component of consumption, respectively. Ytott is the aggregate GDP, ylt is its underground component. 
Since regular and underground consumption data are not available, no statistics are available. The 
statistics are the means of 1000 simulations, of length 150 time periods. Each simulated series is 
detrended using Hodrick-Prescott filter before the statistics are calculated. The numbers in brackets are 
the small sample standard deviations. Sources: Ctott and Ytott are withdrawn from Istat database, ykt and ylt 
are from Bovi (1999), while ckt and clt are generated with our model. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
41 What we do here differs from the first point. Here we compare time series properties among ckt, clt, Ctott, and among 
ykt , ylt and Ytott. In the first point, instead, we compare ckt with ykt and clt with ylt. 
42 As stressed in many contributions (e.g. Deaton 1992, Attanasio 1999, Attanasio and Rios-Rull 2000) both income 
and consumption are quite volatile, even though consumption smoothing is strong evidence across countries and data-
sets. 
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5.1.2 .Aggregate consumption is less volatile than aggregate income 
The analysis of aggregate variables presents a completely reversed picture. 
(Figure 2 about here) 
Figure 2 shows the first 32 quarter response of Yttot, Ctott and Xtott to a one standard deviation 
innovation in regular-sector productivity, underground sector productivity, corporate and 
income tax rates. Notice that impulse response of aggregate consumption is smaller than or 
equal to that of aggregate income. 
A further interesting result concerns volatility measures for both aggregate series, σ(Ctott) and 
σ(Ytott) (see Table l in Section 6.1.1). Note how aggregate consumption and aggregate income 
are less volatile than disaggregated counterparts, and, more importantly, that the former is 
smoother than the latter. Precisely, σ(Ytott) = 1.45 and σ(Ctott) = 1.17. Moreover, it is important to 
stress that we generate all these results with a low risk aversion coefficient, q = 1, consistent 
with empirical micro-studies (e.g. Attanasio, 1999.). 
These results are consistent with the widespread empirical evidence that aggregate 
consumption is smoother than aggregate income, which is one of the most robust empirical evi-
dences matched by equilibrium growth models. 
 
5.1.3 Smoothing and correlations. 
Table 2 presents correlations for consumption and income series, at a disaggregated and 
aggregated level. 
It is worth to notice that the correlation between aggregate consumption and output, ρ(Ctott, 
Ytott) = 0.69, decomposes into correlations between total output and the two disaggregated 
consumption components, ρ(ckt, Ytott) = 0.95 and ρ(clt, Ytott) = -0.96, respectively. Total and 
regular consumption are both pro-cyclical, but the former presents a weaker (positive) 
correlation with aggregate income.43 In the logic of our model, this comes from the fact that 
consumers allocate a share of income to underground consumption, which is countercyclical. 
Since we calibrate the weight of regular sector (0.725) to be larger than that of underground 
sector (0.275), total consumption ends up being pro-cyclical. 
Second, Proposition 2 shows that a sufficient condition for aggregate consumption smooth-
ing, is that correlation between regular and underground consumption, ρ(ckt, clt) should be 
smaller, in absolute value, than correlation between regular and underground output, ρ(ykt,ylt).44 
 
 
                                                 
43 Pro-cyclicality and Counter-cyclicality are defined in this contest with respect to total income, Ytott. 
44 The proof is trivial, but for completeness we present it in Appendix A. 
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TABLE 2: CORRELATIONS 
 ykt ylt Ytott ckt clt Ctott 
ykt 1.00 -0.81 0.89 - - 0.77 
ylt  1.00 -0.45 - - -0.54 
Ytott   1.00 - - 0.80 
 
ykt 
 
1.00 
 
-0.98 
(0.01) 
 
0.95 
(0.01) 
 
0.95 
(0.02) 
 
-0.97 
(0.01) 
 
0.70 
(0.11) 
ylt  1.00 -0.96 
(0.01) 
-0.94 
(0.02) 
1.00 
- 
-0.51 
(0.12) 
Ytott   1.00 0.95 
(0.02) 
-0.96 
(0.01) 
0.69 
(0.11) 
ckt    1.00 -0.91 
(0.02) 
0.75 
(0.10) 
clt     1.00 0.42 
(0.13) 
Ctott       
       
ykt 1.00 -0.97 
(0.01) 
0.99 
(0.01) 
0.96 
(0.02) 
-0.97 
(0.01) 
0.68 
(0.11) 
ylt  1.00 -0.97 
(0.01) 
-0.95 
(0.02) 
1.00 
- 
-0.61 
(0.12) 
Ytott   1.00 0.96 
(0.02) 
-0.97 
(0.01) 
0.69 
(0.11) 
ckt    1.00 -0.91 
(0.02) 
0.72 
(0.10) 
clt     1.00 -0.39 
(0.13) 
Ctott      1.00 
Notes: The first block of the table contains the correlations estimated for the actual data; the second 
blocks presents the correlations estimated on the simulated data. The first one refers to the case s = 1.3, 
the second to the case s = 2.0. The moments matched in the calibration of utility function parameters are 
presented in boldface. See Table 1 notes. 
 
Proposition 2 (Smoothing and Correlation) Aggregate consumption smoothing requires the 
correlation between regular and underground consumption, ( )ltkt cc ,ρ  to be smaller, in 
absolute value, than correlation between regular and underground production, ( )ltkt yy ,ρ . 
Proof. See Appendix A . 
Table 2 shows how the model matches this restriction, since ( )ltkt cc ,ρ  = 0.91 and 
( )ltkt yy ,ρ  = 0.98. In words, this means that regular consumption reacts less to innovations, than 
regular income does. Note that this argument parallels the key concept of the risk sharing argu-
ments discussed by Mace (1991) or Abel and Kotlikoff (1989). The difference is that in this 
case the insurance comes from income smoothing contract (i.e. a "real side" of the market) 
while in the works quoted above insurance originates from investing in financial securities. 
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5.1.4 Consumption and Income Smoothing: Inspecting the Composition 
Here we complete the characterization of consumption and income smoothing, inspecting the 
composition mechanism operating before aggregation of consumption and income series. 
Specifically, we compare impulse response functions and volatility measures for all income 
definitions, Ytott, yk, yl, and for all consumption components Ct, ck, cl. 
(Figure 3 about here) 
In Figure 3 the impact on the endogenous variables of a one-standard-deviation shock to 
regular sector productivity, directly increases capital investment, regular output and regular 
consumption. Note that total consumption rises only gradually. In particular, the household 
composed of Mr. and Mrs. k does not choose to adjust consumption completely after an 
innovation. This is due to inter-temporal substitution and wealth effects, as in a traditional 
Robinson Crusoe economy, but in addition we see the redistribution effect within the family, 
previously defined. Indeed, regular and underground consumption components move always in 
opposite directions, and the former is much more responsive than aggregate variables.45 
Productivity shocks in the underground sector, and increases in tax rates, reverse the picture, 
yielding opposite effects. Now aggregate consumption and production are reduced, together 
with investment. In spite of the remarkable jumps in underground output and consumption, a 
rise in income and corporate taxes reduces regular consumption, total consumption and 
investment, thereby impoverishing the economy and causing a recession. 
Notice that these patters are consistent with a traditional equilibrium growth model (e.g. the 
contributions in Cooley, 1995 or King and Rebelo, 1999). The new insight of our approach 
consists in the opportunity to understand the composition of aggregate in terms of disaggregated 
variables. Concluding, the most interesting results we observe from the four panels of Figure 3 
are that ckt responds to innovations more than Ctott does, and, in absolute terms, also more than 
clt. In addition, total consumption presents a highly persistent response after the shocks. 
(Figure 4 about here) 
Impulse response functions of production series (Figure 4) display an analogous picture, 
                                                 
45 We are suggesting that market and underground consumption profiles, which are defined both as a precontract 
series, are highly negatively correlated. Table 2 (see section 6.1.3) shows that correlation between market and 
underground consumption equals -0.91. To see more clearly forces' interaction, consider the following example. 
Suppose we have a positive productivity innovation in market sector: market income and labor demand increase, and, 
since we know the two sectors have negative correlation, underground income and labor demand fall. Then the family 
reallocates its labor supply to the more productive sector, subtracting it from the less productive. Since labor supply 
cannot be traded (e.g. we cannot short sell H hours worked in one the sector), consumption would follow 
approximately income dynamic. Chiarini and Marzano (2006) examine the relationship between market and 
underground consumption profiles in Italy using econometric techniques in a partial equilibrium framework. Their 
empirical estimates suggest that the two forms of consumption are complements, so implying that when underground 
consumption rises, marginal utility of the market consumption rises too. This finding do not contrast with the 
evidence shown in this paper. In fact, given the negative correlation reported in Table 2, a rise in underground 
consumption reduces market consumption, rising its marginal utility. 
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where ykt and ylt are always negative correlated, and ykt is more sensitive to innovation than Ytott 
and ylt. These results are robust, consistent with time series behavior of income and 
consumption, and support volatility and correlation measures already presented. 
These results are confirmed by the graphical inspection of Hodrick-Prescott filtered series 
for consumption and income (Figure 5). The model generates pro-cyclical regular consumption 
movements, which are positively correlated with regular output. Underground consumption, 
instead, is countercyclical with respect to total consumption, and to regular consumption. Note 
that total consumption is always in between its regular and underground component. Analogous 
comments hold for production series. 
(Figure 5 Panel A and Panel B about here) 
 
6 Conclusions. 
The purpose of this paper is to provide an original interpretation for consumption and 
income smoothing. The underground economy constitute a remarkable size of the GDP in many 
countries and, often, the related behaviors produce a second cycle which gives to households the 
opportunity to ensure themselves against bad times, by entering an income smoothing contract. 
Specifically, workers belonging to same extended family can insure themselves against 
fluctuations in regular and underground income, by entering the income smoothing contract. 
Specifically, each consumer-worker-investor can smooth aggregate income, even though 
disaggregated income and consumption components are more volatile by relying on this risk 
sharing mechanism. The introduction of the underground sector makes expansions less bright, 
and recessions less dark. 
For a given institutional and productive structure, firms smooth production across sectors, 
and households smooth consumption inter-temporally and across sector. Agents diversify both 
economic activities and labor input across sectors, and, by this end (partially) protect the 
consumption flow from income volatility.  
Our income smoothing contract represents, however, one out of many different ways to 
model income smoothing. We think that the economic literature would benefit from a more 
thorough investigation of these composition issues, because they are often ignored in the 
conventional consumption studies as well as in the dynamic equilibrium model literature.  
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Appendix A: Proofs of Propositions in the Text 
Proof of Proposition 1 (Representative Agent and Extended Family). 
Lemma 1 (Households and Extended Families) The consumer side of the heterogeneous agent 
model is represented as the following three equations: ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ltltktltktltktktkt lllvcucullccU µ−−+= 2121,,,    (A.1) 
( ) totttotttotttlttkttt XCKRlwlw +=++−τ1     (A.2) 
( ) totttotttott XKK +−=+ δ11       (A.3) 
Then consumption and income smoothing contract (Definition 1) dictates following two 
conditions: 
1. Income Pooling: t
k
t Ll θ=  and ( ) tlt Ll θ−= 1 . 
2. Consumption Pooling: ( ) jtktlt ccc 21== (see Appendix B). 
Now, normalizing Lt to unity and implementing these features into (A.1)-(A.3), we rewrite them 
as: ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )jtjtjtjtjtjt vcucU θµθθθ −−−−= 1121,    (A.4) ( ) jtjtjtttjtt XckRw +=+− τθ1      (A.5) 
( ) totttotttott XKK +−=+ δ11      (A.6) 
Specifying functional forms ( )( ) ( ) ( )jtjtjtjt hv θγθθθ
γ
−+=−
+
1
1
1
1
 and ( ) ( )ηθθµ
η
+=−
+
1
1
1j
tj
t f  into 
Equation (A.4) we derive equation 4 in the text. Notice (A.3)≡  (A.6). 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 





+
−−−+−−
−=
++−
η
θθγ
θθ
ηγ
1
11
11
1;
111 j
tj
t
j
t
qj
tj
t
j
t fhq
ccu   (A.7) 
Concluding, after introduction of consumption and income smoothing contract, the consumers’ 
side of the model is represented by equations (A.5), (A.6), (A.7). 
Lemma 2 (Firms) Firms are characterized by a production function, and a cost function. ( ) ( ) αα −= 1imtittimt LKMY  and iuttiut LZY =   (A.8) 
( ) ittiuttimttt KrLwLtw +++1    (A.9) 
Now, implementing consumption and income smoothing contract, we rewrite (A8) and (A9) as: ( ) ( ) αα θ −= 1itittimt KMY  and ( )ittiut ZY θ−= 1  (A.10) 
i
tt
j
tttt
i
t
i
t KrtwwKCO ++= θθ ),(   (A.11) 
To derive (A.11), which equals eqation (9) in the text, just simplify the following: 
( ) ( ) ittjttjttt Krwtw +−++ θθ 11 . Hence firms’ problem is represented by equations (A.10) and 
(A.11). 
 Lemma 3 (Government) Government budget constraint is: 
( ) tmttuttkttt GYtYpstlw =++τ  
Implementing consumption and income smoothing, it becomes: ( ) tmttuttttt GYtYpstw =++θτ    (A.12) 
which is equation (10) in the text. 
Finally, the decentralized model we study in this paper is represented by equations (A.5), 
(A.6), (A.7) for j-th household, (A.lO), (A.lI) for i-th firm, and (A.12) for government. 
The solution method used to solve this artificial economy is that suggested by King, Plosser 
and Rebelo (1988a,b). To this end we transform the equilibrium characterization of the 
economy into an approximating first order autoregressive linear system, applying linear 
approximations (e.g. Campbell 1994; Uhlig 1999). 
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Proof of Proposition 2 (Smoothing and Correlations). Assume σ2(clt) = σ2(ylt) 
(Assumption 1), and σ2(ckt) > σ2(ykt) (Assumption 2).46 Let Ctott =ckt + clt, and let Ytott =ykt +ylt. 
Then σ2 (Ctott)= σ2(ckt)+σ2(clt)+2 σ(ckt, clt) and σ2 (Ytott)= σ2(ykt)+σ2(ylt)+2 σ(ykt,ylt), where σ2(x) 
represents the variance of x, and σ(x, y) represents the covariance between x and y. Aggregate 
consumption smoothing implies σ2 (Ctott)< σ2 (Ytott), or, equivalently σ2(ckt)+σ2(clt)+2 σ(ckt, clt)< 
σ2(ykt)+σ2(ylt)+2 σ(ykt,ylt). Rewrite σ(ckt, clt) as ρ(ckt, clt)σ(ckt) σ(clt) and σ(ykt, ylt) as ρ(ykt, ylt)σ(ykt) 
σ(ylt) where ρ(x, y) stands for the correlation between x and y, and σ(x) is the standard deviation 
of x. Therefore: σ2(ckt)+σ2(clt)+2 ρ(ckt, clt)σ(ckt) σ(clt)< σ2(ykt)+σ2(ylt)+2 ρ(ykt, ylt)σ(ykt) σ(ylt). By 
construction we have σ2(clt) = σ2(ylt) and obviously σ(clt) = σ(ylt). Since σ2(ckt) > σ2(ykt) and 
obviously σ(ckt) > σ(ykt), consumption smoothing now implies that ρ(ckt, clt)σ(ckt) < ρ(ykt, 
ylt)σ(ykt), or equivalently 
( )
( ) ( )( ) 1;
; << k
t
k
t
l
t
k
t
l
t
k
t
c
y
yy
cc
σ
σ
ρ
ρ
. Therefore 
( )
( ) 1;
; <
l
t
k
t
l
t
k
t
yy
cc
ρ
ρ
 or 
( ) ( )ltktltkt yycc ;; ρρ < . 
Remark 2 Notice that since ylt=clt, we may rewrite Proposition 2 statement as follows ( ) ( )ltktltkt yyyc ;; ρρ <  or analogously as ( ) ( )ltktltkt cycc ;; ρρ < . 
 
 
Appendix B: Perfect Risk Sharing Scheme 
After entering the contract, consumers agree on a perfect risk sharing scheme, in the sense 
that they set ratio between marginal utilities equal to a constant, i.e. ( )( ) lktljl
tk
j
k
cu
cu
ϕ
ϕ=
,
'
,
'
, 
where u’() represents the first derivative of the utility function with respect individual 
consumption stream. Next, notice that ( ) ( ) ( )tktlktk Cucucu ''' == ; this yields  
.,,
i
tl
l
kj
tk cc ϕ
ϕ=  
Assuming that both consumers have the same weight, we can set φk = φl and therefore ckt = 
clt.  The two consumers will have an equal consumption profile. In terms of total consumption, 
we have ckt = clt =1/2 cjt, where cjt represents consumption chosen by j-th household at time t. 
                                                 
46 Both assumptions are derived from empirical evidences, robust across countries and data sets, and matched by our 
model, see Deaton (1992), Attanasio (1999), Schneider and Enste (2000). 
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Appendix C: Sensitivity Analysis 
 
totYσ  totCσ  
tot
tot
Y
C σ
σ  ρ(Ytot, Cu) ρ(Ytot, Ctot) 
h = 0.35 1.05 0.96 0.91 -0.97 0.45 
h = 0.38 1.02 0.91 0.90 -0.93 0.32 
h = 0.44 1.27 0.97 0.76 -0.94 0.68 
h = 0.46 1.32 1.20 0.91 -0.98 0.77 
h = 0.48 2.03 1.86 0.92 -0.98 0.71 
      
η = 1.25 1.67 1.30 0.78 -0.98 0.71 
η = 1.27 1.34 1.21 0.90 -0.95 0.74 
η = 1.29 1.1 0.90 0.82 -0.94 0.54 
η = 1.31 1.13 1.11 0.98 -0.93 0.58 
η = 1.33 1.35 1.25 0.92 -0.95 0.57 
η = 1.40 1.26 1.10 0.87 -0.95 0.17 
      
f = 1.90 1.36 1.18 0.86 -0.94 0.45 
f = 1.92 1.41 1.19 0.84 -0.94 0.52 
f = 1.94 1.25 1.13 0.90 -0.96 0.55 
f = 1.96 1.25 1.04 0.83 -0.95 0.71 
f = 1.98 1.49 1.36 0.90 -0.96 0.73 
f = 2.00 1.10 1.05 0.95 -0.98 0.70 
Notes: 
totYσ  represents the total production standard deviation, totCσ  is total consumption standard de-
viation, ρ(Ytot, Cu) is the correlation coefficient between total production and underground consumption, 
and ρ (Ytot, Ctot) is the correlation coefficient between total production and total consumption. 
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